Visibility improved throughout the day although conditions were still difficult for the enemy to attack from the air. Between 0250 and 0315 hours the convoy was however attacked by the Italian MAS boats The main body of the convoy meanwhile continued on its way unhindered after the attacks of the motor torpedo boats except for an attempt by three torpedo planes around 0700 hours.
They were to land the passengers and stores, complete with fuel and return to Force H as soon as possible.
At 1000 hours, the Capt. The enclosed hangar design required a deck of approximately this thickness to ensure adequate hull integrity, so the limited armour protection was a by-product of the enclosed hangar design.
They arrived at Gibraltar at 1800/30. The aircraft turned away before they reached a favourable attack position. This was only temporary though and at 0630 hours speed was increased to 17 knots and by 0800 hours (daylight) even to 19 knots. Once power was then lost, it was impossible to prevent the ship from sinking—her fate was more the result of design flaws than of the actions of her captain.Friedman. The after control position followed about 0915 hours. It appeared therefore that the pocket battleship, which was still thought to be the The Commander-in-Chief had planned that ‘Force H’ which had returned to the Cape on 7 November would then sweep towards Durban, arriving there on 16 November. The fleet remained about 35 nautical miles south of Malta during the afternoon. Shortly after midnight a signal was received that it was intended that the carriers could launch their Hurricanes for Malta at 1000 hours. Position was 37°49'N, 08°58'E. hours that day the Admiralty issued orders that British ships were not to proceed to French ports. An unknown number of torpedoes were dropped by the other aircraft. For the next ten hours strenuous efforts were made to persuade the French Admiral to accept one of the British alternatives, but without success. After landing on the striking force course was altered to the south-westward to give the Italians the impression that having bombed Cagliari the force had achieved its object and was withdrawing. Course was then set for the eastward. None could predict the result of these measures on the Franco-British relations, but it was sure they would not be improved. At 1554 hours (zone -1) Force H sadly opened fire on the ships of their former ally at Mers-el-Kebir, inflicting heavy damage and grievous loss of life. Also submarines and surface torpedo craft were a constant menace. At 1100 hours, the Capt. At 2130 hours, Force H turned to the eastward again towards the flying off position. In addition no.6 hold and the after engine room were both flooded. November 1941 im Mittelmeer von dem deutschen U-Boot U 81 torpediert und sank am folgenden Tag im Schlepp vor Gibraltar. From Between 1500 and 1515 hours RDF reported that enemy aircraft were shadowing the fleet but by now weather had deteriorated and there was much low rain cloud. This was the At 1115 hours an enemy signal was intercepted that our forces had been sighted at 0800 hours. Meanwhile in the western Mediterranean at 0325 hours a strike force was launched by The striking force consisted of nine Swordfish each armed with four 250lb G.P. At this time HMS Nelson, with it's gun armament unimpaired was thought to be capable of 18 knots or more. P (port) 3, 4.5” gun turret in Speed was increased to 24 knots at 2038 hours and a westerly course was maintained throughout the night. In the meantime. Also around 1000 hours, convoy ME 3 arrived at Alexandria. HMS Cossack was able to avoid this torpedo by the HE of this torpedo being picked up by her Asdic set. On 23 July 1941, the day the eastbound convoy would reach ‘the narrows’ five empty transports and two tankers would depart Malta for Gibraltar (Convoy MG 1) The seven empty transports were;
The strength deck is designed to carry structural loading in combination with the hull girder and side and bottom plating. The torpedo bomber striking force from The British forces were meanwhile rapidly closing the enemy coast. Fighter patrols were maintained overhead during the day. © 1995 - 2020 Guðmundur Helgason The aircraft did not attack. At 1015/28 the City of Pretoria was circled several times by a large three-engine seaplane, with distinct French markings, which approached from the direction of Bizerta.
Due to the bad weather conditions and visibility the Commander-in-Chief decided to haul off the the eastward and northward and then work round to engage from the westward at dawn. Meanwhile on the 25th all destroyers of group 2 were fuelled by RFA Brown Ranger but not without delay as Brown Rangers speed was slower then anticipated and she was therefore further to the west then anticipated.
At 0820 hours, large volumes of smoke were seen over the horizon in the direction of Rhodes. On aircraft dropped its torpedo out 450 yards 20° on Nelson's starboard bow passing over the ship at a height of 200 feet. After parting with the convoy in the evening of the 23rd, Vice-Admiral Sommerville had taken force H westward at 18 knots until the afternoon of the 24th going as far west as 03°30’E. One survivor stated that around 0930 hours a shell penetrated the turbine room and another one entered a boiler room.